The Munich Air Disaster 1958

Flight 609 Zulu Uniform was now attracting some attention after the two abandoned take off attempts. A number of people, including the Airport Director, stopped to watch the departure preparations. Someone took a photograph. Zulu Uniform was becoming the centre of attraction and was not allowed to leave unobserved. With the decision now made to try again the passenger waiting in the departure lounge were summoned less that 10 mins after leaving the aircraft. Amid some surprise and with coffee only half drunk, the Manchester United party somewhat reluctantly boarded the aircraft. There was little fooling about now and the atmosphere was tense. Matt Busby was overheard to say that if it wasn’t so important for them to get back and get some rest before the game on Saturday they would have left it until the next day. As the passengers settled just before 1500hrs GMT (1600hrs local); the door was closed and Captain Rayment lifted the handset to say a few words. The passengers were informed that the technical fault had been resolved and they would shortly be on their way. The flight time was to have been just under three hours, and with the one hour time change, ETA in Manchester was to have been 1800hrs.

ZU: 609 Zulu Uniform, Would you have my clearance renewed. I am about to restart.

MT: Munchen Tower, roger. A few seconds later. B-line 609, cleared to start engines. Your flight plan has been delivered to ATC (Air Traffic Control).

MT: 609 Zulu Uniform, Munchen Tower, Wind 290, 8 knots, cleared to runway 25. QNH 1004. Time 56 and ¾ over.

The aircraft moved across the tarmac for the three minute taxi to the runway as the final departure checks were being completed. Approaching the threshold the tower was contacted for permission to enter.

MT: B-line Zulu Uniform, cleared to line up and hold, and here is your clearance – Munchen Control clears b-line 609 to Manchester airport via route as filed. Maintain one seven thousand feet, right turn after take off, climb on south course inbound Freising range and maintain four thousand feet until further advised, over.

The clearance was read back, this time without error, and the aircraft positioned on the runway in preparation for the engine run check.

A final few words were exchanged between the captains and it was agreed that Thain should keep his eyes glued to the engine instruments and adjust the throttle himself if any surge occurred.

Commencing take off the throttles, as before, were slowly moved up to 28in of boost and the brakes released.

Gingerly, Rayment advanced the throttles inch by inch, followed though by Thain who, as duty demanded, kept his attention fixed inside the flight deck monitoring the engines. Acceleration was slower than normal as the throttles were ever so gently opened to full power. Even in the passenger cabin the slow engine response was noticed. As the aircraft gathered speed thick showers of slush were thrown up from the undercarriage and could be seen by the passengers on either side. Thain followed carefully through with his left hand as Rayment pushed the throttles against the stops with his right. Once again Thain tapped the back of Rayment’s hand and took control of the throttles. At Rayment’s request to “check full power” Thain, with eyes fixed on the gauges, replied “full power set, temperatures and pressures ok”. Now established in the take off run with all well and full power set, acceleration continued, albeit at a slower pace, with Thain calling the speeds, 60k 70k – at around 85k Thain suddenly called out that the port engine was surging slightly. While Thain dealt with the surging, Rayment transferred from nose wheel to rudder control as the rudder became fully effective with the increase in speed. Rayment now pulled gently back on the control column to raise the nose at about 4 degrees above normal and lift the nosewheel free from the slush in preparation for take off. The simple manoeuvre was achieved with some difficulty. Meanwhile Thain eased the left throttle rearward until the surge ceased with the boost pressure reading 54in. Slowly but steadily the port throttle was pushed open again until fully open. Both boost pressures now showed 57.5in with no evidence of surging. Thain confirmed again that full power was set with temperatures and pressures ok then returned his attention to the airspeed indicator. The speed showed 105k. Acceleration was continuing slowly but to Thain, with his attention still on instruments, this did not seem unusual. Thain now called 110k and he watched the airspeed indicator move more sluggishly round the dial, flickering as it did so as if striving to grasp every knot. At 117k Thain called out “V1”, the decision speed, the point after which there was insufficient runway to stop. Zulu Uniform was committed to take off.

Rayment now made a slight adjustment to aircraft trim to ease the strain of holding the nosewheel off the ground while Thain’s eyes remained fixed on the airspeed. The next speed call would be 119k, or V2 (the minimum safe speed required in the air following an engine failure at V1, the worst possible moment for such an incident). After V2, Rayment would be free to pull back further on the column to fly off the ground and the aircraft would then be at a safe flying speed even if loss of power occurred at one engine. Zulu Uniform was by now well down the runway and was approaching the area where even slush was unmarked by previous aircraft movements. Acceleration was negligible and the airspeed still hovered on 117k. Suddenly there was a marked drop of about 4-5k and for the first time Thain had the distinct feeling of “lack” of acceleration. The power then dropped and faltered at about 105k. The end of the runway was now approaching with insufficient speed for flight and no room to stop! As the pilots confronted their dilemma Rodgers, the Radio Officer, continued with his duties by transmitting a last message to the tower….

The Crash

The aircraft left the paved surface and ploughed through the snow towards the boundary fence. Rayment shouted “Christ, we won’t make it”. Thain looked up for the first time to see the dramatic scene before him as Zulu Uniform, already 200 yards past the end of the runway, tore through the fence and on across a small road on the other side. Ahead, immediately within their path, lay a house and tree. With his left hand Thain banged the already fully open throttles while Rayment tried in vain to pull Zulu Uniform off the ground. Rayment called for the undercarriage to be retracted in a desperate attempt to do something to become airborne. Thain quickly selected the gear up and the aircraft’s movements became smooth as if flying through the air. Thain gripped the instrument coaming with both hands and the two pilots watched helplessly as the aircraft began to turn slowly to the right on a path between the house and a tree which they could not miss. In the tower, the controllers were blind to the drama, they heard only Rodgers last attempt at a message followed by sound, which, in the words of the official report, “starts with a howling whistling noise and ends with a load background noise before contact was broken off”. Thain ducked his head beneath the coaming as it was obvious that a collision with the house was inevitable as the aircraft struck the house. The impact tore off the left wing outboard of the engine, ripping off part of the tail unit and setting the house on fire. The aircraft span out of control, its speed carrying it beyond the house and into the tree which struck the left side of the flight deck, tearing open the cockpit. One of the wheels broke off and spun off towards a vehicle on the road whilst the broken aircraft continued to slither on the snow. 100 yards later the right fuselage after the wings struck a wooden garage containing a truck, severing the complete tail section. The truck petrol tank exploded covering the shed in flames. The remains ploughed on for about another 70 yards before coming to a halt whilst the now detached port engine continued for a few more yards. The series of impacts enveloped the planes occupants in a cacophony of breaking, tearing and crashing noises whilst they were being violently shaken and spun in the burning aircraft. Then suddenly, quiet; as if the noise had suddenly been turned off. Nobody spoke nor cried out. Not a sound stirred in the eerie silence.

Rayment, sitting on the damaged side of the flight deck was badly injured, but Thain, unhurt, quickly came to his senses and gave an immediate order to evacuate. Rodgers pulled open the battery master switch and pulled several circuit breakers to shut off dangerous electrical circuits that could provide further fire hazards, then squeezed through the emergency window of the galley door. The exit had been dislodged but escape was still possible, but the door leading through to the passengers was jammed solid behind a wall of luggage. Thain got up to follow Rodgers but Rayment was struggling in his seat. Rayment said he was stuck and could not get out, Thain urged him to get out and Rayment suggested Thain go on ahead. Thain then crawled through the same exit used by Rodgers and quickly tried to make assessments. There were a number of fires around the aircraft, flames could be seen at the stub of the left wing and below the right wing where a 500 gallon tank was still intact. There was a very real risk of a great explosion. Standing amidst the wreckage were the two stewardesses but many of the passengers, still stunned and dazed, were still in their seats. Thain shouted to the girls to get away from the wreckage. Peter Howard, a Daily Mail photographer, fumbled about in a bewildered state, stumbled across a hole and simply crawled out on his hands and knees, closely followed by his assistant Ted Elyard. Harry Gregg, intact apart from the loss of his shoes, and with little more than a bloody nose, managed somehow to struggle free from the wreckage. Meanwhile Thain and Rodgers, ignoring the danger of explosions, clambered back into the wreckage to grab the two flight deck fire extinguishers, pausing only to reassure Rayment that, as soon as the fires were out, they would be back to help. As Thain discharged the extinguishers at the fire by the broken wing, he noticed through a window Billy Foulkes still sitting in his seat, stunned by the impact. He shouted to him to get out, Billy panicked at first, then realised that his seat belt was still fastened. Quickly undoing his belt, Foulkes checked his legs for damage then leapt through a gap that had opened up just near him. Once free, he ran 200 yards before daring to stop and look around.

Soon the hand held extinguishers were spent, useless against the conflagration and they were discarded. A thick column of black smoke rose into the grey sky. Undeterred by the blaze and imminent danger, Rodgers, the two stewardesses, Bellis and Cheverton, Elyard, Gregg and Howard, joined by Foulkes, re-entered the wreck to help those trapped inside. Thain returned to Rayment, still trapped in the flight deck. In the broken cabin, Matt Busby was found seriously injured near the rear of the aircraft, clutching his ribs, propped up on one elbow. Someone rolled up a coat and slid it beneath him for support. Ahead of Matt, Bobby Charlton sat slumped in his seat, still fastened by his belt, next to him Dennis Violett also sat slumped in his seat. Both appeared beyond help. As the rescuers approached Bobby Charlton stirred as if waking up, sat upright and undid his seat belt. He then simply stood up and walked towards them; Dennis Violett followed suit! On the left, Jackie Blanchflower was alive but nursing a badly cut arm which was quickly dressed with someone’s tie. It seemed, in spite of the awful wreckage, that the casualty figures, at least in the forward section, were light.

Little did the rescuers know that, of the 44 people on board, including the crew, 20 had already lost their lives. 11 members of the United party had perished, including 7 players, the coach, the trainer, secretary and one director. At just 1500hrs GMT on a bleak winter’s day in Munich, in an area not much bigger than a football field, the hopes, aspirations and dreams of a great football team lay shattered in ruins. The steward and one Yugoslav passenger had also died.

Small fires continued to burn throughout the aircraft but the feared explosion did not occur and rescue work was able to continue. On the smashed flight deck Captain Rayment was unable to be freed by Captain Thain and it soon became obvious that cutting gear was needed. Soon first aid and ambulances appeared on the scene, followed shortly by the fire services. The flames around the wreck were quickly brought under control and the seriously injured rushed off to hospitals. Thain borrowed a fireman’s axe and returned to the Flight Deck to attempt to free Rayment but had no luck. Eventually rescuers persuaded Thain that he really should go to hospital for a check up and so, with thumbs up to Rayment, he allowed himself to be led to a waiting vehicle and left the scene. Rayment waited calmly to be rescued. Later, rescue workers climbed onto the roof of the cockpit via the starboard wing and managed to release Rayment, badly injured, from the tangle of metal. Soon he too was on his way to the Rechts der Isar hospital to join the other injured, some relatively free, but others, like Rayment, badly injured.

After the last of those rescued had been removed from the scene the search continued for survivors, but after 2 hours, all hopes of finding anyone alive dissipated. A newspaper man searching the rubbish for a missing can of film of the match cleared some litter and underneath was young Ken Morgans, unconscious but alive! That brought the total number of survivors to 24, but sadly not for long. News came through that Frank Swift, the News of the World reporter severally burned, had died of his injuries. Casualty figure now stood at 21 dead.

I would like to point out here that Frank Swift had been a giant in the game with Manchester City, a goalkeeper – who on retirement from the game became a sports reporter. Therefore Manchester City were also deeply involved in this tragedy. Something to note for some current Manchester City fans. He is listed in City's "Hall" of all time greats.

Of the 23 survivors, 15 had been detained in hospital. 6 of these were dangerously ill, including Ken Rayment, Matt Busby, Johnny Berry, Duncan Edwards and two of the Yugoslavian passengers Eleanor Miklos and Vera Lukic (No relation to footballer John Lukic).

As airport officials waited at the scene of the crash for the German Federal Crash Investigators to arrive, news of the tragedy spread like wildfire around the planet. The entire city of Manchester was shaken to its very foundations. HM The Queen sent a message of deepest sympathy to the Lord Mayor of Manchester and to the Civil Aviation Minister. President Tito of Yugoslavia sent Prime minister McMillan a message:

“I am deeply moved by the news of the disaster which is a blow to British sport and the English people. Allow me to express my deepest sympathy”

Indeed, the effects of the catastrophe rippled far beyond Northern England and the World of football.

In the hours after the accident the weather worsened and snow fell continuously throughout the evening. The Luftfahrt Bundesamt accident investigation team, headed by Chief Inspector of Accidents Captain Hans-J Reichel, was despatched from Braunschweig (Brunswick) in northern Germany and arrived to examine the wreckage for clues to the possible cause of the crash. They arrived at 2200hrs, six hours after the crash and a thick layer of snow covered the wreckage. Accident investigation at that time was hardly the precise science it is nowadays, but even by the standards of the day, the examination seemed somewhat perfunctory. Little or no attempt was made to protect evidence and newsmen, reporters, photographers and airport workers and officials milled all over the scene. No lighting was made available for the investigators; indeed, a BBC cameraman had to provide the only illumination available. Reichel's own words from the official report describe what was found:

“The wrecked aircraft was covered with a layer of snow about 8cm thick. The right wing which was only slightly damaged, was still firmly attached to the fuselage and had not been exposed to the effects of the fire, presented a completely even layer of snow. This was powdery and could be brushed away with the hand without difficulty. Under this was a layer of ice, the upper surfaces of which were very rough, frozen firmly onto the skin of the wing. When one ran one’s hand over it felt like a very course kitchen grater. The very loose powdery snow had not blended at all with the ice. It could, for example, be blown off without difficulty, so as to leave the bare ice exposed. I found the same condition at all points of the wing which I examined thoroughly, with the exception of the part above the engine nacelle and in the region of the slipstream. Here, after the snow had been removed, the bare outer skin was visible, without any ice accretion. Apart from this icing I could find nothing which could have been the cause of the accident, or could be considered to have contributed to it.

And that was that! Icing was the cause of the accident! As far as could be ascertained no further inspection took place, and had it not been for the opposition of others concerned, the West German authorities would have disposed of the wreckage the next day! In London, the same day, a BEA accident investigation team was convened and immediately flew to Munich. The Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation’s appointed investigator, G Kelly, left the morning of Fri 7^th February but his flight diverted to Frankfurt due to bad weather and his arrival at the scene was later than hoped. At the time of Kelly’s departure Captain Thain and they crew reluctantly appeared before a press conference on the promise that afterwards they would be left in peace, a condition to which the press duly consented. Thain, in no fit state to face the rigours of further interviews, was ordered by the BEA doctor to rest for the remainder of the day. The West German investigator Reichel, in the absence of Thain, conducted his enquiries at the airport and approached Black, the BEA station engineer, regarding incidents leading to the fatal crash. Much of the discussion centred on the engine problems encountered during the take off attempts, and then turned finally to details of the conclusive sequence of events.

Black: The aircrafts nose lifted after it has covered approximately the first third of the runway and then continued in this normal attitude until approximately halfway or two thirds of the runway had been covered. I was unable to see whether or not the wheels were on the ground all the time as the aircraft was enveloped in slush and spray during its whole run.

Black: One possibility I feel could be the amount of drag caused by excessive slush on the runway.

Reichel: The Captain or course should know his aircraft and under what conditions he can attempt to take off!

The next morning, Sat 8^th February, Captain Reichel obtained an interview with Captain Thain in the presence of the ministry representative G Kelly, BEA’s Chief investigator Wg Cmdr J Gibbs and a number of other officials. After some preliminary enquiries about events leading up to the third attempt to take off, the questioning proceeded to the loss of speed experienced.

Reichel: How does Captain Thain explain the drop in speed, if the instruments were reading correctly?

Thain: My opinion is that the aircraft’s speed was retarded on the ground, and I think there must have been snow of sufficient depth to retard the speed and not the engines.

Reichel: There were at most 4 cm of snow on the runway, quite wet snow. The impression of the wheels went right through to the concrete.

Thain: When we landed from Belgrade there was a tendency to slide, but very shortly the braking action was positive.

Reichel: The runway is long. The previous attempts at take off were abandoned in the middle of it.

Thain: My duty, which I performed in the aircraft, is not too look out from inside.

Reichel: When it was apparent that the end of the runway had almost been reached, and the speed was dropping, why did he (Rayment) not abandon the take off?

Thain: When he reached a speed of 117k, the length of the runway remaining was such that he had no alternative but to keep going. When the speed fell to 105k and he wanted to abandon the take off, it was impossible to halt the aircraft before it reached the house.

Reichel: After the accident we established that the starboard wing had a layer of firm and very rough ice on it. Under the covering of powdery snow the surface of the ice was quite rough. The wing surface above the engine, in the region of the propeller slipstream, was free of ice. This was established about 30 mins after the start. (This is a lie; the inspection took place about 6 hours after the crash).

Thain: When I walked out to the aircraft on the first attempt, I could see the snow thawing on the wings and count the ribs of the aircraft.

Thain: My personal feeling is that there must have been a large quantity of snow built up at the end of the runway that prevented the aircraft from accelerating.

Final Attempt at Take Off

The Crash